Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 21 | Issue 2

Article 8

5-1-2007

Recognizing the Larger Sacrifice: Easing the
Burdens Borne by Living Organ Donors through
Federal Tax Deductions
M. Lane Molen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons
Recommended Citation
M. Lane Molen, Recognizing the Larger Sacrifice: Easing the Burdens Borne by Living Organ Donors through Federal Tax Deductions, 21
BYU J. Pub. L. 459 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol21/iss2/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Recognizing the Larger Sacrifice: Easing the Burdens
Borne by Living Organ Donors through Federal Tax
Deductions
I. INTRODUCTION
Organ transplant recipients are the beneficiaries of a modern medical
miracle. The “gift of life” provided by an organ donor often allows the
recipient to be transformed from a terminally ill patient into a healthy
survivor.1 One transplant surgeon described his feelings of witnessing
this transformation as a “constant joy and thrill . . . to see a chronically,
ill, debilitated patient, often full of pain from his fingertips to his toes . . .
restored to normal within days after the [transplant] operation.”2
The limit on organ resources, however, prevents many patients,
families, and physicians from feeling this type of thrill. Currently, an
average of seventy-seven people receive an organ transplant each day in
the United States.3 However, another nineteen people die due to a
shortage of available organs for transplantation.4 This steady parade of
deaths numbered approximately 6,400 in 2002, and has only increased
since.5 Putting the 2002 yearly number in a more familiar context, it
equals roughly twice the total amount of U.S. soldier deaths experienced
in the current war in Iraq to date.6 These deaths affect all segments of
American society; victims of organ shortage “are ethnically and
geographically diverse, their deaths typically passing unnoticed” to the
general population. 7
1. For an interesting description of the kidney “Transplant Olympics,” which displayed to
the world the ability of a transplant patient to recover, see RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY
30–31 (1981).
2. Id. at 31.
3. OrganDonor.Gov, Access to U.S. Government Information on Organ and Tissue
Donation and Transplantation, http://www.organdonor.gov (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
4. Id.
5. “More than 80,000 Americans are currently awaiting organ transplants, yet fewer than
25,000 people received a transplant in 2002. During that same year more than 6,400 people died
while waiting for a transplant.” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERV., VARIATION IN ORGAN DONATION AMONG TRANSPLANT CENTERS 1 (2003),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-02-00210.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.] (citing
United Network for Organ Sharing statistics). At the current average rate of 19 deaths per day, the
expected total for 2007 would be over 6,900.
6. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status: Fatalities as of January 12, 2007,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
7. Sean Arthurs, Comment, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model
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The problem is worsening as the need for organs continues to
increase at an alarming pace. At the beginning of 2007, there were
approximately 94,800 candidates on the national patient waiting list.8
This is an increase of over 24,000 from June 2000.9 Thus, the demand for
donor organs has skyrocketed while supply of cadaveric donors “remains
stagnant at approximately 5,000 per year.”10 As a result of this shortage
of cadaver organs, patients have been increasingly relying upon
transplants from living donors. Organ donations from living donors
doubled from 1995 to 2004.11 Many courageous Americans have stepped
in to fill the need on behalf of family, friends, and in some cases,
complete strangers.
People on the waiting list for an available organ know that they have
a good chance of dying before they are able to receive a transplant.
Obviously, the longer they must wait, the more their health declines and
thus the worse their odds of surviving become. But the consequences do
not end there. Large economic costs are borne by American citizens and
government as a result of organ shortage. Patients awaiting transplants
incur large medical bills, at a catastrophic economic burden to
themselves, and often at the expense of the government.12 Thus, living
organ donors not only provide the organ recipient with a life-saving gift,
they also provide an economic benefit for the government. According to
one expert, Medicare incurs approximately $55,000 per year per patient
in direct dialysis costs alone.13 Since “waiting time for a deceased donor
kidney is approximately 4 years longer than a living donor kidney,”
Medicare saves roughly $220,000 on average for a living transplant.14
Further, this tragic shortage of organs persists in the face of public
Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of Our National Organ Donation Regime, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2005).
8. OPTN.org, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://www.optn.org (last
visited Jan. 23, 2007) (numbers as of that visit).
9. Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49
EMORY L.J. 917, 917 (2000) (citing United Network for Organ Sharing statistics).
10. Lynt B. Johnson, Some of the Challenges of Encouraging Organ Donation Among
Minority Populations, 65 N.C. MED. J. 35, 35 (Jan./Feb. 2004), available at http://www.
ncmedicaljournal.com/jan-feb-04/ar010408.pdf.
11. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK/SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF
TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, TABLE 1.1, U.S. ORGAN DONORS BY ORGAN AND
DONOR TYPE, 1995 TO 2004 (2005), http://www.optn.org/AR2005/101_dh.pdf [hereinafter
OPTN/SRTR 2005 ANNUAL REPORT].
12. See Andrew MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus the Ethical
Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 177, 179 (1997).
13. Ginny Bumgardner, Testimony before Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education and Related Agencies 3 (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.a-st.org/PublicPolicy/Library_pdfs/Roundtable%20L-HHS-EduWrittenTestimony41105%20_
D0040522.pdf.
14. Id.

459]

ORGAN DONORS AND TAX DEDUCTIONS

461

support for organ donation from the vast majority of Americans. A 1993
poll undertaken by Gallup and a 2004 study conducted by the Coalition
for Donation put public approval for donating organs upon death at 85%
and 91%, respectively.15 These poll numbers suggest that increasing the
amounts of donated organs is not only life-saving and economically
sensible, but also supported by the public.16
Several policy changes have been proposed through the years to
alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. Some of these proposals
call for drastic overhaul of the American system, departing from the
altruistic opt-in system currently in place.17 But until the shortage of
cadaveric donors can be alleviated, patients will continue to rely on the
brave generosity of these living organ donors, who place their life at risk
and undergo great economic, physical and psychological expense to
donate.
As we focus our efforts on the plight of patients desperately waiting
for organ transplants by working to increase the organ supply, we must
not lose sight of the sacrifice of living donors, and the difficulties they
may face in donating. Indeed, a great inequity exists in the law. The
United States Tax Code allows for charitable contributions to be
deducted from taxable income.18 This encompasses not only simple cash
contributions, but also programs that encourage citizens to donate used
automobiles to organizations such as the Kidney Foundation, with the
allure of getting a deduction from taxable income in the amount of the
value of the donated car.19
Theses deductible contributions should be supported and admired,
because they provide a necessary monetary boost to the organizations
that promote organ donor programs. However, the sacrifice of cash or
cars should not be given greater respect than that of the actual donors,
whose sacrifice is deeper and far more worthy of our nation’s
recognition. Sadly, those who courageously undergo the economic,

15. The Gallup Organization, Inc., The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Organ Donation
and Transplantation, Section I (Feb. 1993), http://www.transweb.org/reference/articles/gallup_
survey/gallup_chap1.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Gallup Poll]; G. David Fleming,
Investigating the Relationship Between Commitment to the Concept of Donation & Compliance,
NATCO IN TOUCH (bi-monthly bulletin), available at http://www.natco1.org/members/pdfs/
NATCOInTouch_May-Jun05.pdf (referring to cadaveric donation).
16. Moreover, most major religions have expressed that donating an organ does not violate
their religious principles and doctrines. American Red Cross, Tissue Donation: Statements from
Various Religions, http://www.redcross.org/donate/tissue/relgstmt.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
17. The current system relies on donors to “opt-in” to the system, altruistically choosing to
make their organs available posthumously. See infra Part II.A.
18. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2000). See also National Kidney Foundation, Kidney Cars, http://www.
kidney.org/support/kidneycars/index.cfm.
19. National Kidney Foundation, supra note 18.
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physical and psychological hardship of donation do not receive the same
treatment as those who donate their old car.
Recent legislation at the state level seeks to reimburse living donors
to a certain extent by providing tax deductions in order to reduce the
overall expense.20 On the federal level, the Organ Donation and
Recovery Improvement Act of 2004 (“ODRIA”) is also a step in the right
direction.21 ODRIA does not address the tax code, but instead provides
funds for reimbursement grants from the government to the organ
donor.22 Thus, it is also a significant step in the right direction toward
alleviating the financial burdens of donating. However, ODRIA is an
incomplete remedy as it will only be applied in cases of low-income
donors and low-income recipients; many donors will receive no financial
relief at all.23
This Comment argues that federal tax law should be changed to
follow the legislative example displayed by states that have enacted
deductions. Specifically, the Tax Code should be changed to allow living
donors who provide an organ for transplant to deduct the expenses of
travel, lodging, and lost wages attendant with donating an organ that are
not covered by insurance. The deduction would only cover the expense
of donating, and not the organ itself, in order to comport with the U.S.
altruistic system.
A federal tax deduction would complement ODRIA by providing
another level of assistance to the majority of donors, who are unable to
benefit from the Act. It would help to ensure that every living organ
donor receives financial assistance and is dealt with fairly. The changes
would serve to further basic intuitive principles of fairness—to recognize
the great sacrifice made by those who risk their lives to save the life of
another, and to give a small measure of financial assistance to help them
recover. Why should the citizen who donates his used-up car receive
government recognition for his altruism in the form of a tax deduction,
while the organ donor who gives of her time and risks her life, may
receive nothing?
Clearly, resolving the organ shortage will take much more than a
mere change in the Tax Code. Extensive proposals to that end are outside
the scope of this Comment. Removing a part of the financial burden for
living donors through a tax deduction may, in fact, remove some
financial disincentives to some donors and slightly increase the organ
supply. However, instead of justifying a tax deduction only as a means of
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part III.C.
42 U.S.C.A. § 274f (West 2005).
Id.
See infra Part III.B.2.
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resolving the organ shortage, this Comment argues that the rationale for
such change should also focus on providing recognition for the good that
organ donors provide to society. This good should be recognized, and
without betraying our altruistic system, should be reimbursed. Further,
such a change would be a positive step in addressing the basic unfairness
which currently exists in the Tax Code.
Part II of this Comment provides background on the organ shortage
problem and describes the current donation system in the United States.
Part III examines legislative action that has been taken on a state and
federal level, including the recently-passed Organ Donation and
Recovery Improvement Act’s reimbursement authorization for living
donors. Part IV proposes a federal tax deduction and discusses arguments
for and against the implementation of such a tax deduction for living
donors at the federal level. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will provide an introduction to America’s altruistic, optin organ donation system, and the legal framework in which the system
works. In addition, this section will discuss the two methods of organ
donation—living and cadaver—and present the advantages and
challenges to procuring organs through each method.
A. America’s System of Donation
Two systems for procuring organs from the deceased are in common
usage around the world. Many European countries with histories of
stronger state intervention use an opt-out, or “presumed consent” system,
in which citizens are presumed to have chosen to donate their organs at
death and instead must explicitly elect out of the system.24 Meanwhile,
other countries with “strong normative concepts of individual rights and
property rights” including the United States use an opt-in organ donor
system.25 In these systems, prospective donors are given the opportunity
to elect into the system. In the United States, this is typically done while
obtaining a driver’s license.26
24. NORA MACHADO, USING THE BODIES OF THE DEAD 45 (1998); See also Monique C.
Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, Note, The United States System of Organ Donation, the
International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: “And the Winner is . . .”, 20 J. CORP.
L. 5, 21 (1995).
25. MACHADO, supra note 24, at 44.
26. Another commonly suggested system is called “mandated choice,” which would require
citizens to choose whether they would be donors. The hope of such a system is that by being forced
to choose, more citizens would elect to become organ donors, thus mitigating the shortage. See
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The opt-in system is based, at least in part, on three principles. First
is the idea that the altruism of citizens, not government compulsion,
should provide the impetus for organ donation.27 To promote this
altruism, public relations campaigns have utilized spokespersons like
Michael Jordan,28 and feel-good stories that tell of patients eagerly
awaiting transplants, and the prospect of the pain of a donor’s tragic
death being somewhat mitigated by the preserving of the donee’s life.29
Second, a close corollary is that commoditization of the body and its
parts should be avoided. Proponents of an altruistic system contend that
that life and the body are intrinsically sacred and immeasurably valuable,
and that putting a price on them is repugnant.30 Such proponents take the
view that, “[t]o speak of personal attributes [that which ‘has become
identified with a person, with her self-constitution and selfdevelopment. . .’] as fungible objects — alienable “goods” — is
intuitively wrong.”31 Additionally, such proponents want to “prevent the
poor from being exploited, and ensure that the wealthy [a]re not the only
segment of society who [have] access to life-saving organs.”32 Finally,
proponents of the opt-in system contend that the method is preferable
because it better effectuates the desires of the deceased, in that it ensures
Bernard T. Kwitowski, Learning From Each Other: Combining Strategies to End the Organ
Shortage, 9 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 141, 152–53 (2005). See also COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, STRATEGIES FOR CADAVERIC ORGAN PROCUREMENT: MANDATED CHOICE AND
PRESUMED CONSENT 2 (1994), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_2i93.pdf
[hereinafter COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS] (arguing that the objection to the
coercion of mandated choice “holds little weight when the cost of mandated choice is compared to
the social benefits of such a policy”).
27. Proponents of altruistic systems may argue that altruism “foster[s] social integration,
contributing to the sense of belonging and participation among members of a community. . . .”
MACHADO, supra note 24, at 58.
28. Lara Wozniak, Jordan Makes Pitch for Organ Donations, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.
18, 1996, at 1E.
29. See, e.g., supra note 3. Additionally, such campaigns also typically seek to dispel
prevalent myths that abound regarding organ donation. Sadly, such public relations campaigns are
hampered by stories—both true and false—that describe ostensibly unfair donor preferences given to
celebrities or politicians. While many Americans like the idea of extending life to those in need of
their donor organs, they may be put off when they see Mickey Mantle or David Crosby quickly
acquiring a donor organ. See Phyllis Coleman, Brother Can You Spare a Liver? Five Ways to
Increase Organ Donation, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1996).
30. See, Cynthia B. Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces to Make Babies: The Gift of the Magi
Revisited, 24 J. MED. & PHIL, 288, 291-92 (1999) (“The reason we are reluctant to exchange money
for human kidneys is that this would deny something distinctly valuable about human beings—their
human dignity and worth. . . . When we or our integral body parts are sold, our dignity as human
beings is denied.”). However, see generally Eric A. Posner & Cass S. Sunstein, Dollars and Death,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005) for a discussion of how the legal system and governmental
institutions assign monetary values to human lives.
31. Cohen, supra note 30, at 293 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1880, 1880 n. 115 (1987)).
32. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America’s Organ
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 99 (2004).
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that the wishes of those who object to donating their organs are
respected.33 As previously discussed, this argument can be criticized,
among other reasons, because the intent of a would-be donor may be
subverted under the current system by the desires of the family or the
failure of the individual to express those desires.
A key aspect of the American opt-in system is the illegality of
exploiting organ transplantation for monetary gain. This prohibition
provides the legal boundaries of the opt-in system, delineated by the
National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 (“NOTA”).34 NOTA was
enacted in order to clear up uncertainty that existed in regards to organ
sales and to ensure equitable distribution of donated organs (so that
recipients of transplant organs were not limited to only the wealthy).35
The Act prohibits the buying and selling of transplant organs for
“valuable consideration” if the transfer “affects interstate commerce.”36
The Committee believed that human bodies should not be made into
commodities,37 and sought to “prohibit the assignment of a monetary
value to an organ.”38
However, while NOTA sought to close the door on the sale of the
organs, it left open a window to reimbursement for costs associated with
donation.39 It explicitly excluded from valuable consideration
“reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,

33. See J. MICHAEL DENNIS ET AL., PRESUMED CONSENT SUBCOMMITTEE AND UNITED
NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING ETHICS COMMITTEE, AN EVALUATION OF THE ETHICS OF
PRESUMED CONSENT AND A PROPOSAL BASED ON REQUIRED RESPONSE (June 30, 1993),
http://www.unos.org/resources/bioethics.asp?index=1. See also COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that “[t]he individual’s interest in controlling his or her own
body, even after death, is a widely accepted value in organ transplantation and other medical
contexts”).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
35. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984). See Gail L. Daubert, Comment, Politics, Policies, and
Problems With Organ Transplantation: Government Regulation Needed to Ration Organs
Equitably, 50 ADMIN L. REV. 459, 464 (1998).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
37. NATIONAL ATTORNEYS’ COMMITTEE FOR TRANSPLANT AWARENESS, ORGAN AND
TISSUE DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1995), http://www.transweb.
org/reference/articles/donation/nacta.html. (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) [hereinafter COMMITTEE FOR
TRANSPLANT AWARENESS].
38. Francisco L. Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives—Not Payment—For Organ Donation,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 25, 25 (2002). Since NOTA, efforts have been made to soften its prohibition.
For instance, the American Medical Association lobbied Congress in 2003 to examine the possibility
of softening NOTA’s ban on consideration, and “allowing financial incentives for the donation of
cadaveric organs.” Daniel T. Stimson, Private Solicitation of Organ Donors: A Threat to the
Fairness of the U.S. Organ Transplant System, or a Solution to the National Organ Shortage?, 10
MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 349, 357 (citing Andis Robeznieks, Bill Would Allow Studies on Organ
Donation Incentives, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 11, 2003, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2003/08/11/prsb0811.htm).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 274e. See also Delmonico et al., supra note 38.
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implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred
by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the
organ.”40
B. Cadaveric Shortage and the Increasing Demand for Living Donations
There are two types of organ donation: living and cadaver (procuring
organs from the deceased). Each type has identifiable advantages and
disadvantages.
1. The shortage of cadaveric organs
Cadaveric organ donation is advantageous in two key ways. The first
is that unlike with living donors, there is obviously no health risk to a
donor who is already deceased. To some scholars this advantage for
cadaveric donations is paramount. One commentator has noted the
difficulty of medical professionals in reconciling the risks posed by
living organ donation with the Hippocratic Oath.41
The second obvious advantage to cadaveric donation is that one
cadaver donor can yield a greater quantity and variety of organs than can
a living donor. The amount of organs capable of procurement from living
donors are obviously limited.42 Meanwhile, an estimated average of 3.53
organs can be recovered per cadaveric donor.43
40. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
41. Arthurs, supra note 7, at 1126. In support of using cadaveric donors over living
donors, Arthurs concluded:
Even if medical advances can reduce the post-operative casualty rate to a fraction of a
percent, any mortality rate above zero becomes indefensible when compared to a viable
alternative with a mortality rate of zero. Not surprisingly, neither doctors nor medical
administrators are blind to this risk assessment yet they are hardly given a choice: in the
absence of sufficient numbers of cadaveric organs and confronted with the everexpanding organ transplant wait list, the risk associated with living organ donation pales
in comparison to the eventuality associated with inaction.
Id. at 1126.
42. Limited to one of the following: kidneys, lung lobes, liver segments, pancreatic segments,
and in rare cases, hearts and intestines. United Network for Organ Sharing, Living Donation Facts,
http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/facts/organs.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
Meanwhile, cadaver donors can simultaneously yield far more organs, along with corneas, skin,
ligaments, tissues, and more, which cannot be given by a live donor. MACHADO, supra note 24, at 2.
Of course, it is possible that a living donor could make more than one donation over the course of a
lifetime.
43. This is the recovery rate as of 2005. The organs transplanted per donor, however, is 3.06.
ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK/SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, TABLE 2.12, DECEASED DONOR ORGAN UTILIZATION, 19962005, available at http://www.optn.org/AR2006/212_dc.htm [hereinafter ORGAN UTILIZATION
TABLE]. A cadaver donor can conceivably provide a heart, two lungs, a liver, two kidneys,
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The downside to cadaveric donation stems from the significant
constraints that exist on the supply of available, eligible organs from
deceased donors. It is these constraints which contribute most to the
organ shortage we now face. While there have been many proposals as to
the ways in which these restraints can be lessened and cadaver donation
can be maximized, they lie outside the scope of this Comment. Instead,
my purpose with this discussion is to provide context to show why living
organ donation has grown in frequency and importance, and to propose
ways to deal with the difficulties encountered in the process for the
donors.
The initial obstacle to a larger supply of cadaver organ donors is the
natural ceiling on potential donor organs. Qualifying to donate requires
that the donor’s organs be viable—meaning the body must be free of
serious disease and the organs are fully functioning and effective.
Therefore, the cadaver donor must have died in such a way as to preserve
the integrity of his or her bodily organs—most commonly due to severe
head trauma or some sort of brain hemorrhaging.44 This constraint
drastically reduces the potential pool of donors. Estimates place the
annual supply of potential cadaver donors between 12,000 and 15,000.45
This constraint on the potential supply is, in practical terms,
insurmountable. Doctors can only take organs from donors who meet
these qualifications, and we cannot change the amount of such viable
donors. Estimates further indicate that if we had a 100% recovery rate on
donors—using organs from all 15,000 potential donors—a pool of over
50,000 organs would result, taking us much farther in fulfilling our organ
donor needs, if not eventually resolving them.46
Unfortunately, additional constraints prevent full usage of potential
cadaveric donors. In America’s system, the percentage of potential
donors for whom consent can be obtained is a key factor. A Department
of Health and Human Services 2001-2002 study evaluating variation in
donation among transplant centers put the national average consent rate

intestines, stomach, pancreas, blood vessels, tissues, ligaments, bones, corneas, and more. For a
detailed description, see MACHADO, supra note 24, at 2 (fig.1) (1998).
44. DAVID PRICE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 27 (2000).
45. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 5, at 1. Estimates on this statistic vary, however.
See Edward Guadagnoli et al., Potential Organ-Donor Supply and Efficiency of Organ Procurement
Organizations, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., 101 (Summer 2003).
46. See Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe Unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal
Considerations in Rejecting a Deceased’s Anatomical Gift Because There Is No Consent by the
Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REV. 323, 324 n.12 (2002) (noting that 50,000 “would be sufficient because
approximately 5,000 new patients are added to the list each year. . . . Over time, if 50,000 more
organs were available, the list would be whittled down to a point where supply could easily meet
demand.”).
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for these centers at 51%.47 This is a low number considering that public
opinion polls report that 91% of Americans support the idea of donation
after death,48 and that 62% of Americans would want at least some of
their organs donated if they died in an accident—a difference of over
10% above the consent rate.49 An improvement to accurately reflect this
preference would have profound results. Even an increase of 10% over
current recovery rates could result in the availability of up to an
estimated 4,600 additional organs.50
With such high support for organ donation, why is organ recovery so
much lower? First, many Americans have not expressed their organ
commitment for a variety of reasons, including ignorance, apathy,
concerns based on widely-held myths, worry that donating will make
their death more difficult for loved ones, or an unwillingness to
contemplate their own mortality.51 Instead, they may “prefer to avoid the
stress or even the physical effort required to sign up.”52
Second, recovery of cadaver organs typically involves the input and
consent of family members who may refuse even if the deceased has
previously indicated his or her intent to donate. A potential donor who
has filled out an organ donation card is often refused if his or her next-ofkin declines.53 Many organ procurement centers refuse to procure validly
donated organs “unless consent is given by a next of kin and no other
next of kin objects.”54 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act55 deems the
wallet-sized donor cards to be a legal instrument permitting physicians to
remove the deceased’s organs,56 yet few states take advantage of these
cards and actually retrieve organs based only on the authority of a donor
document.57 Most states still consult the next-of-kin; by 1988, forty-four

47. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 5, at 1.
48. Fleming, supra note 15. See generally, Gallup Poll, supra note 15; Press Release, Living
Legacy Foundation, National Survey: Support for Organ Donation Strong, Steps to Take are Mostly
Unknown (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.lcnw.org/info/press/pages/pr-2005-04-07.html.
49. Fleming, supra note 48. See also, A Majority of Americans Say that if Killed in an
Accident, They Would Want Their Organs Used for a Living Person Who Needed Them, PR
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 23, 2003, at 1 (citing a Wall Street Journal/Harris Interactive Health-Care poll).
50. The 4,600 approximation is calculated by taking 10% of 15,000 multiplied by the
recovery rate from cadavers (3.06). The 3.06 average is taken from ORGAN UTILIZATION TABLE,
supra note 43.
51. Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity To Motivate Organ Donations, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 296 (2005).
52. Id.
53. See Bucklin, supra note 46, at 324.
54. Id. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., A Primer on Organ Donation, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8 (2002).
55. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
fnact99/uaga87.
56. COMMITTEE FOR TRANSPLANT AWARENESS, supra note 37.
57. Bucklin, supra note 46, at 324–25.
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states had enacted “required request” legislation, which requires consent
from the next-of-kin in order for procurement to take place.58
Since the organs must be procured as soon as possible after death
(including brain death),59 physicians are often forced to request
permission from family members at the worst of times—shortly after a
loved one has been pronounced dead.60 At such a traumatic time, a
decision as to what to do with the deceased’s organs can be
overwhelming. In many instances, the preferences of the deceased have
not been discussed with family members,61 who may be dissuaded by
concerns of disfigurement, a delayed funeral, poorer medical treatment,
and more—even if such concerns are unfounded.62 Doctors often give in
to the family’s wishes because they “fear upsetting families . . . [and the
threat of] harmful publicity or litigation.”63 In fact, in a survey of organ
procurement organizations, only 12% ranked “priority of the deceased’s
wishes” as their top consideration in deciding whether to use the
deceased’s organs, whereas 48% ranked the impact on the deceased’s
family as the top factor.64 Worse yet, in some cases, doctors presume the
next-of-kin will not give consent and do not even bother to ask.65 These
difficulties with consent have led to suggestions that the next-of-kin
should not even have a say in the matter.66
58. Id.
59. Maximum ischemic time (the time that the organs are outside the donor’s body and
without blood circulation) varies by organ. For instance, a heart may only have up to four hours,
while a kidney may have up to thirty-six. PRICE, supra note 44, at 25 (citing Paul J. Hauptman &
Kevin J. O’Connor, Procurement and Allocation of Solid Organs for Transplantation, 336 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 422, 428 (1997)).
60. News Release, University of Iowa, UI Study: Emotional Aspects of Organ Donation
Need Attention, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~ournews/2004/february/021004organdonation.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
61. See COALITION ON DONATION, TOPLINE SUMMARY REPORT FOR 2004 QUANTITATIVE
RESEARCH STUDY 1 (2005), available at http://www.donatelifeamerica.org/downloadables/
pdf/Topline_Summary_Report_Qualitative.pdf (reporting that only 49% surveyed had told a family
member that they wished to have their organs donated); Gallup Poll, supra note 15 (52% surveyed
had spoken with a family member). See also Amy Vandenbroucke, HIV and Organ Donation:
Illinois’ Solution to Organ Donation Shortages, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1285, 1294 (2006).
62. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 51, at 298; THE STATE OF ORGAN, EYE & TISSUE DONATION:
COLORADO & WYOMING, April 2006, at 9-10.
63. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 51, at 298.
64. See Kwitowski, supra note 26, at 145.
65. Lior Jacob Strahilivetz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 808 (2005)
(In sixteen percent of all cases involving transplantable organs, families are never even
asked whether they are willing to donate the organs. Here the law and prevailing
practices are perplexing. A decedent’s unambiguous instructions to destroy a home are
disregarded, but parents often are presumed to believe that their children’s valuable
organs should be destroyed.)
(citing Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States,
349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667, 671 (2003)).
66. One commentator noted:
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Although a significant amount of families who know the wishes of
the deceased still elect to withhold from donation,67 one study suggested
that significant gains are possible if more potential donors discuss their
desires to donate with their loved ones and/or have those desires
reinforced by a physician who is privy to their legal documentation.68
Whereas a lack of surety over the deceased’s wishes makes some
families hesitant, a study conducted in Pennsylvania and Ohio concluded
that the likelihood that they will choose donation is nearly seven times
greater if informed of the deceased’s preferences.69
2. Living donors
With the worsening shortage of available cadaveric organs,70 more
and more patients are looking to living donors for transplant organs.
From 1993 to 2003, the percentage of transplants coming from living
donors rose from 16% to 27%.71 Put another way, the amount of living
donors more than doubled from 1995 to 2004, from 3,493 to 7,002—an
amount practically equal to the amount of cadaver donors.72 Because
humans have two kidneys and can function normally with only one, the
majority of organs donated from living donors are kidneys.73
A primary advantage of living organ donation is the immediacy of

One estimate is that if all OPOs took all organs donated by decedents, without asking for
consent of next of kin, the number of organs recovered would be more than doubled.
What would two times as many transplants do for society? The answer is impressive. We
would have a smaller transplant waiting list, Medicare would have a huge financial
burden lifted from it, and more people would be able to work fully and lead better lives.
Bucklin, supra note 46, at 324.
67. See Laura A. Siminoff & Renee H. Lawrence, Knowing Patients’ Preferences about
Organ Donation: Does It Make a Difference?, 53 J. TRAUMA 754, 756 (2002).
68. See discussion below infra Part IV.
69. See Siminoff & Lawrence, supra note 67, at 754. See also Bumgardner, supra note 13, at
4 (“[O]ver 95% of families would consent to organ donation if they knew it was the wish of their
loved one.”).
70. For instance, the Mayo Clinic states on its website that while 15,000 patients are
registered on the waiting list for a new liver, only about 4,500 cadaver donor livers become available
for transplant each year. Mayo Clinic, Living Donor Liver Transplant at Mayo Clinic in Rochester
and Arizona, http://www.mayoclinic.org/liver-transplant/livingdonorlivertransplant.html (last visited
Jan. 4, 2006).
71. Rachel Emma Silverman, A Tax Break for Your Kidney; States Move to Allow
Deductions for Expenses and Lost Wages Incurred During Organ Donation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
2004, at D1.
72. OPTN/SRTR 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11. Despite equaling cadaveric donation
in number of donors, the percentage is far less due to the amount of organs that can come from a
cadaveric donor.
73. Approximately 95% of living donor transplant organs in 2004 were kidneys. Id. See also
National Kidney Foundation, Q&A on Living Donation, http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/
livingDonors/infoQA.cfm#1d (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
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treatment—the recipient need not wait for a suitable cadaver donor.74
However, another advantage is the reduced risk of organ rejection.75 The
genetic similarities, organ size, and blood type compatibility are higher
in organs procured from relatives of the patient.76 Further, the
environment in which the transplantation takes place is more controlled,
and can be planned and optimally executed.77 The survival and long-term
success rates of kidneys are greater when procured from a living donor.78
Finally, unlike with cadaveric donors, gaining consent for living
donations is simpler from a legal standpoint, since potential donors are in
complete legal control of their organs and may choose to give as they
please.
On the other hand, there are downsides of living organ donation.
First, the transplantation procedure poses a small attendant risk of
medical complications79 and even death for the donor.80 The risks are
minute, but real—with the odds of death in the donation process
estimated at three out of every 10,000.81 There is also the attendant future
risk for the donor of being left with only one kidney—which may present
more risk than living with both.82 Donors also report that “ongoing
medical and psychological problems, albeit mild, persist for many
months after donation.”83
Psychological risks are manifest in the form of depression or other
psychological effects.84 These difficulties naturally extend to—and may
74. Mayo Clinic, supra note 70.
75. United Network for Organ Sharing, Living Donation Q&A, http://www.transplantliving.
org/livingdonation/questions.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
76. Id. See also MACHADO, supra note 24, at 47.
77. MACHADO, supra note 24, at 47.
78. See Medical College of Wisconsin, First Major Kidney Transplant Study Shows
Increased Organ Survival Rates (2000) http://healthlink.mcw.edu/article/953057292.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2007).
79. PRICE, supra note 44, at 220–24.
80. Id. at 220.
81. Robert S. Gaston, Is it Safe to Donate a Kidney?, 11 TRANSPLANT CHRONICLES Summer
2003, at 8, available at http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/livingDonors/pdf/safe_to_donate.pdf.
See also PRICE, supra note 44 (noting that between 1980 and 1991, clinics reported five donor
deaths out of 19,368 kidney donations).
82. MACHADO, supra note 24, at 47–48; Gaston, supra note 81, at 8 (“Potential long-term
complications remain the greatest concern of professionals involved with live donor
transplantation.”). But see, PRICE, supra note 44, at 220–21 (“Studies over a long period have failed
to reveal any increased risk of renal failure following nephrectomy . . . .”).
83. Abhinav Humar, Living Donor Liver Transplants: Potential Disadvantages, 19 J.
GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY S304, S304–S306 (2004).
84. Living Organ Donor Advocate Program, Living Organ Donor Issues,
http://www.lodap.com/id14.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). See Eric M. Johnson et al., Long-Term
Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors: Quality of Life After Donation, 67 TRANSPLANTATION 717,
720-21 (1999). But see, PRICE, supra note 44, at 221 (noting that despite studies reporting
psychosocial complications such as post-donation depression, the evidence is inconclusive).
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even be exacerbated in—those cases where the donor’s organ is rejected
by the recipient, or when the recipient dies shortly after.85 Because of
these concerns, psychological evaluations are sometimes added to the
battery of tests prospective donors must go through.86
Providing an organ transplant can be a significant drain on a donor
economically as well as physically and psychologically. These drains
come in the form of discomfort, extended physical recovery time,87
expenses related to the surgery, and lost wages.88 Before the donation, a
potential donor must undergo numerous tests to ensure compatibility
with the recipient, including blood, tissue and urine tests, x-rays,
antibody screens, and—in the case of female donors—gynecological
examinations and mammograms.89 The time taken to undergo these preoperative tests as well as the surgery procedure itself and recovery times
that are typically two to six weeks90 add up to a significant amount of
time away from work for the donor. Although the recipient’s insurance
typically covers the actual medical expenses,91 the costs associated with
travel, lodging, child care, and lost wages can be daunting.92 The lost
wages that add up can be especially difficult on low income families, and

85. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Facts About Living Donation,
http://www.optn.org/about/donation/livingDonation.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). See also PRICE,
supra note 44, at 222 (donors who expressed dissatisfaction or regrets regarding the donation were
often donors in cases where the recipient had died within one year post-transplant) (citing Johnson et
al., supra note 84).
86. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, supra note 85.
87. Mayo Clinic, supra note 70.
88. See discussion infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
89. United Network for Organ Sharing, Being a Living Donor: Tests Involved,
http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/livingdonor/tests.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
See also Mayo Clinic, The Transplant Process, http://www.mayoclinic.org/liver-transplant/
transplantprocess.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
90. See Hume-Lee Transplant Center, Kidney Transplant Program: Living Kidney Transplant
Program,
http://www.vcuhealth.org/transplant/transplant_kidney_living/transplant_kidney_living.
htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007); Larascopic Living Kidney Donation, http://www.rogosin.org/
LaparoscopicDonorBrochure.pdf (pointing out that time missed from work may depend on the
physical nature of the donor’s employment) (last visited Mar. 10, 2007); Mayo Clinic, supra note 70;
NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, Liver Transplant, http://www.nyptransplant.org/liver/cli_ser/liv_
don.html?name1=Living+Donor&type1=2Active (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
91. United Network for Organ Sharing, Financial Aspects: Living Donation Costs,
http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/financialaspects/costs.aspx (last visited Mar. 10,
2007). There may be circumstances, however, where complications arise for donors that are not
covered by insurance. Mark W. Russo & Robert S. Brown, Jr., Financial Impact of Adult Living
Donation, 9 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION S12, S12–S15 (2003). In some instances, donors may be
entitled to disability pay. See United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 75.
92. See Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 3; Russo & Brown, supra note 90, at S12–S15; U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PARTNERING WITH YOUR TRANSPLANT TEAM: THE
PATIENT’S GUIDE TO TRANSPLANTATION, at 22 (2004), available at http://www.unos.org/
SharedContentDocuments/Transplantation_Guide_Final-3-04-04.pdf.
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in some cases living donors have even lost their job due to donating.93
The sad case of employees losing their employment due to becoming
living donors appears relatively rare, although it would, of course, be
very serious.94 The prospect of a donor losing his or her job for donating
strikes almost anyone as patently unfair.
As for total financial setbacks, reliable numbers are very difficult to
determine, and reliable studies scant.95 One decade-old study placed the
mean number for out-of-pocket donor expenses at $579, but the numbers
ranged from $0 to $20,000.96 In addition, some donors have experienced
difficulty obtaining health insurance, or face rising premiums as a result
of donating.97
Even if steps are taken to maximize recovery of cadaveric donations,
living donors will still be called upon, as long as the natural constraint on
qualifying cadavers (as discussed above) remains constant, and as long
as there are still differences in the survival rates. As science works to
further reduce the risk to the living donor, the law should similarly
reduce the financial costs of donation. Society should send a message
that it acknowledges and lends support to brave citizens who sacrifice to
save others, and that organ donation qualifies as a social good that
accrues to us all.
III. LEGISLATION AIMED AT REMOVING DISINCENTIVES FOR LIVING
DONORS
The concept of using tax deductions as a means of addressing organ
shortage is hardly novel. Various measures have recently been enacted
on a state and federal level that have specifically addressed living donors.
These measures have sought to facilitate donation from living donors and
ease financial burdens. These recent measures, especially at the federal
level, suggest that Congress may be prepared to further act on this issue
and embrace tax relief for living organ donors.
More specifically, the state tax deductions for living donors provide
an example of how to proceed and have introduced us to opposing
arguments to such a federal tax deduction. This section describes not
93. See, e.g., Jonathan Maze, Living Organ Donors Put More than Life on the Line: South
Carolina Lawmakers Weigh Tax Break, POST AND COURIER, May 16, 2004, at A1.
94. This author could not locate any studies on the subject.
95. See R.S. Gaston, Limiting Financial Disincentives in Live Organ Donation: A Rational
Solution to the Kidney Shortage, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2548, 2548–55 (2006).
96. Johnson et al., supra note 84. These numbers would be higher due to inflation and rising
medical costs.
97. Living Organ Donor Advocate Program, supra note 84. However, results vary: some
insurance companies view the donor as a healthy person, since they could not donate otherwise. Id.
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only the historical proposals (and the obstacles they faced), but also the
recent legislation and the opportunity to improve on this legislation.
A. Historical Proposals
As the technology and understanding needed to make organ
transplantation became increasingly viable, the demand for organs also
increased. Therefore, a variety of solutions to the shortage have been
proposed over the last three decades. An in-depth look at every proposal
aimed at easing the organ supply shortage is outside the scope of this
Comment. Instead, the focus will be on proposals regarding tax
deductions.
The idea to use tax deductions has been proposed before, but never
implemented. In 1981, a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives that would provide a tax deduction for decedents, not
living donors.98 This proposal provided for a $25,000 tax deduction for
qualified transplant donations.99 The primary purpose for the bill was as
an incentive to increase the cadaveric organ supply. In addition, bills
have also been introduced which would allow tax credits for living organ
donors.100 However, none of these bills have been passed into law, either.
B. Recent Federal Legislation
Two pieces of legislation passed in the last decade have sought to
address the financial difficulties of living organ donors. These two pieces
of legislation are the Organ Donor Leave Act and the Organ Donation
and Recovery Improvement Act. This Comment briefly discusses the
first of these and more closely analyzes the second.
1. Organ Donor Leave Act
First, the federal government and some state governments have
addressed the inherent conflict between organ donors and their
employers by enacting legislation that provides government employees
with paid donor leave. The federal government was first, enacting the
Organ Donor Leave Act in 1994, with subsequent amendments in

98. H.R. 3774, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981).
99. Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the Supply of
Transplantable Organs, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 409 (1985).
100. H.R. 2474, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). H.R. 2090, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001). Rep.
Jim Hansen (R-UT) introduced a similar bill for a $10,000 credit applying to deceased donors, in
2001. See H.R. 1872, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
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1999.101 Various states have also enacted such measures.102 The federal
legislation permits “[a]n employee in or under an Executive agency” to
take leaves of absences without reduction in pay for up to seven
workdays in the case of bone marrow donors and thirty workdays in the
case of organ donors.103 These paid leave programs have attracted very
little in the way of comment or controversy, perhaps in part because
other paid or unpaid leave programs have been in existence for years,
including paternity and maternity programs.104
2. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act
Another recently passed federal initiative addresses the financial
difficulties many donors face.105 The Organ Donation and Recovery
Improvement Act (“ODRIA”) was designed to increase organ donation
and recovery.106 ODRIA authorized federal spending of $25 million in
funding for “travel and subsistence expenses for living donors, organ
donation education and awareness activities, grants for hospital organ
coordinators, and other programs designed to increase organ donation
rates and improve organ recovery rates.”107 This included $5 million per
year to reimburse living donors for expenses incurred in donating.108
ODRIA is “groundbreaking” as it is the first enacted federal legislation
that provides reimbursement to living donors, and because it “opened the
101. Organ Donor Leave Act of 1994, Pub. L. No 103-329, 113 Stat. 407 (1994) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C.S § 6327 (2005)); Memorandum from Janice R. Lachance, Dir. of the U.S.
Office of Pers. Mgmt, to heads of executive departments and agencies (Nov. 2, 1999),
http://www.opm.gov/oca/compmemo/1999/organ.htm.
102. Numerous other states have legislation permitting state employees to take unpaid leave to
donate. Erin Madigan, States Offer Tax Breaks to Spur Organ Donation, STATELINE.ORG, Aug.
26, 2004, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&content
Id=15749.
103. 5 U.S.C.S. § 6327 (2005).
104. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601–2654 (2000).
105. Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 3.
106. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584
(1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f (2007)). The stated purpose of ODRIA as
described by Sen. Frist, its sponsor:
[To] improve the overall process of organ donation and recovery, enhance our knowledge
base in these fields, encourage novel approaches to this growing problem [of a critical
shortage of transplantable organs] and increase the number of organs available for
transplants each year. The bill also seeks to remove potential barriers to donation, while
identifying and focusing on best practices in organ donation.
Margaret R. Sobota, Note, The Price of Life: $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500 for a Kidney? An
Argument to Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar to the Market for Human Egg
Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1234 n.71 (Fall 2004) (citing 149 CONG. REC. S3330 (daily
ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist)).
107. Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 3. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f.
108. Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 3.
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door to further financial incentives, such as payments to families of
deceased donors to offset funeral costs.”109
ODRIA provided for $15 million in grants for programs that
effectively promote education and awareness concerning organ
donation.110 It also provided $2 million for studies related to scientific
advancement in procurement and transplantation, in order to “maximize
existing donation practices,”111 and $3 million in grants to “organ
coordinators” to increase donation and transplant success rates.112
Most pertinent to this Comment, ODRIA authorizes $5 million in
grants to “[s]tates, transplant centers, qualified organ procurement
organizations . . . or other public or private entities for the purpose of . . .
providing for the reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses
incurred by individuals toward making living donations of their
organs . . . .”113 Under ODRIA, donors are ineligible to receive payment
if their expenses are paid for by another source, such as the organ
recipient, insurance provider, or from a state program.114 This provision
is intended to ensure that the payment is a reimbursement, and not a
financial compensation for the organ.115 ODRIA is a significant step in
the right direction, as it provides some live donors with financial relief
and mitigates some of the financial disincentives for the poorest donors.
However, while this provision of the bill is an excellent start, it is an
incomplete solution.
The political viability and popularity of ODRIA is evident. The
measure was supported by the American Medical Association,116 it
passed in both houses of Congress with near-unanimous consent, and on
April 5, 2004, President Bush signed it into law.117 Indeed, one scholar
noted the appearance of “widespread sentiment in this country that live
donors should not personally bear any costs associated with donation.”118
That is not to say that it comes without the potential for objection. The

109. J. Alex Little, The ANGEL Act: A Proposal to Encourage Organ Donation After Death, 3
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 685 (2005) (citing Jim Warren, Financial Support for Live Donors, Organ
Trafficking, Stem Cell Research Among Major News Events of 2004, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Dec.
31, 2004).
110. See Bumgardner, supra note 13; 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f .
111. See Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 5. See Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f (2007)).
112. See Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 3. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f.
113. 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f.
114. 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f(d).
115. Sobota, supra note 106, at 1235.
116. Calandrillo, supra note 32, at 112.
117. See Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 1–3.
118. Francis L. Delmonico, Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, MEDSCAPE
TRANSPLANTATION 5(1), Jan. 7, 2004.
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law could be criticized if its interaction with NOTA is viewed as suspect
due to its provision allowing the donor to be reimbursed for expenses
incurred in bringing up to two travel companions.119 Detractors may
argue that since NOTA “implicitly precludes payment to anyone other
than the donor,” being reimbursed for expenses incurred by travel
companions puts the two in conflict.120
ODRIA is administered through the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), a subdivision of the Department of Health and
Human Services. In order to provide the authorized reimbursements,
HRSA has partnered with the Regents of the University of Michigan in a
four-year, $8 million agreement, together creating a national mechanism
for distribution of the funds to living organ donors.121 Living donors from
across the United States will be able to receive reimbursement if they
meet eligibility criteria that HRSA and University of Michigan have
developed.122 The proposed criteria have been published in the Federal
Register and are currently subject to public comment.123 It must be noted
that the reimbursement program is still in its infancy, and the eligibility
criteria discussed here have yet to be finalized.124
To be eligible for reimbursement, a donor must be a U.S. citizen with
his or her primary residence in the U.S and must donate at a qualifying
transplant center.125 The donor must meet the requirements of informed
consent, be in full compliance with NOTA, and must not be participating
in any restricted exchange program.126
In addition, applicants must meet the income eligibility
requirements. ODRIA is constrained in the number of donors who can
qualify. Funding is limited, so HRSA must prioritize reimbursement
119. 42 U.S.C.S. §274f(c)(2) (2007).
120. Alicia M. Markmann, Comment, Organ Donation: Increasing Donations While
Honoring Our Longstanding values, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 499, 508–09 (2005). See
42 U.S.C.S. § 274e(c)(2)(2007).
121. E-mail from Mesmin Germain, Public Health Analyst, Health Resources and Services
Administration, to M. Lane Molen (Jan. 26, 2007, 13:05:19 MST) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Email from Mesmin Germain, Jan. 26, 2007]; see also, HEALTH RES. AND SERV. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., http://granteefind.hrsa.gov/searchbyprogram.aspx?
select=U13&index=165 (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). See also, As of April 9, 2007. Reimbursement
of Travel and Subsistence Expenses Toward Living Organ Donation Proposed Eligibility Guidelines,
72 Fed. Reg. 17,564, 17,565 (Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines].
122. E-mail from Mesmin Germain, Jan. 26, 2007, supra note 121; E-mail from Mesmin
Germain, Public Health Analyst, Health Resources and Services Administration, to M. Lane Molen
(Jan. 29, 2007, 07:17:13) (on file with author).
123. As of April 9, 2007. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 121. “The final program eligibility
criteria will be posted on the Reimbursement of Travel and Subsistence Expenses for Living Organ
Donation Web site, http://www.livingdonorassistance.org.” Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 17,566.
126. Id.
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grants in accordance with the donor’s ability to pay for donor expenses.
While HRSA seeks to assist as many qualified donors as possible, the
Act provides that the Secretary must give preference “to those
individuals that the Secretary determines are more likely than otherwise
unable to meet such expenses.”127 An administrator for the program
confirms that, indeed, the program is not designed to reimburse donors
who can themselves “reasonably pay for the[] expenses.”128
Furthermore, ODRIA explicitly precludes payments where “a donor’s
eligible expenses have been, or reasonably can be expected to be, paid by
the organ recipient.”129 Thus, the recipient’s ability to pay is also a
crucial factor.
Because of this statutory proscription (on paying for expenses a
recipient could reasonably pay), the first major obstacle for a
reimbursement applicant is whether the recipient is deemed to have the
ability to pay.130 According to the proposed guidelines in the Federal
Register, the threshold of income eligibility for the recipient is 200% of
the Health and Human Services poverty guidelines.131 According to
HRSA, “[a]t any income above this measure, it can reasonably be
expected that the recipient of the organ could pay for the donor’s
qualifying expenses.”132 Under the 2006 HHS poverty guidelines, a
donor in a single-person household would generally be ineligible if the
recipient had an income above $19,600 in the applicable year.133
Exceptions to this rule may be made by the program’s Review
Committee on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the recipient’s
hardship.134 Such exception can be made if the social worker or other
appropriate personnel involved in the transplant “can provide a written
justification that notwithstanding the potential transplant recipient’s
income level, significant financial hardship is likely be encountered by
the potential transplant recipient of the organ for the payment of the
donor’s qualifying expenses in the course of the donation process.”135 It
127. 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f(b).
128. E-mail from Mesmin Germain, Public Health Analyst, Health Resources and Services
Administration, to M. Lane Molen (Feb. 27, 2007, 05:28:30 MST) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Email from Mesmin Germain, Feb. 27, 2007].
129. Id.
130. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 121, at 17,565. “The program’s authorizing legislation
explicitly states that funds ‘will not be expended to pay the qualifying expenses of a donating
individual to the extent that payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made. . .
by the recipient of the organ.’” Id (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Amounts for residents of Hawaii and Alaska differ.
134. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 121, at 17,565.
135. Id.
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appears from the proposed eligibility criteria that if this exception is not
met, and the recipient does not meet the income requirements, then the
donor will not be eligible for reimbursement.136
The guidelines’ assumption that at 200% above the poverty level
recipients can be reasonably expected to pay the donor’s expenses seems
misplaced. Given that the Act is “intended for individuals with end stage
organ failure,”137 the recipients have likely been undergoing extensive
medical treatment and are financially strained. While some recipients
may be in a financial position to pay the donor’s expenses, ODRIA only
allows for reimbursement if the recipient is less than 200% of the poverty
level. For example, this means that, despite extensive personal medical
and other related expenses, the ODRIA expects a recipient making
$20,000 per year to be in a position to pay the donor’s expenses.
If the recipient is not deemed to be reasonably expected to pay for
the donor’s expenses, then the donor’s income level is the next factor
considered. When a donor’s income level exceeds 200% of the HHS
poverty level, priority will be given elsewhere.138 While donors with
higher incomes may have a chance to receive reimbursement, they are
only reimbursed as funds allow. To summarize, HRSA provides an order
of preference categories, as follows:
All live organ donors are eligible for reimbursement of qualifying
expenses provided all the criteria for donor reimbursement are fulfilled.
However, subject to availability of funds, preference will be given to
donors who are more likely to be otherwise unable to meet the
qualifying expenses, in the following proposed order of priority:
Preference Category 1: Donor income and recipient anticipated income
each is < =200% of the HHS Poverty Guidelines in their respective
States of primary residence.
Preference Category 2: Donor income is < =200% of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines in the State of primary residence.
Preference Category 3: Recipient anticipated income is < =200% of the
HHS Poverty Guidelines in the State of primary residence.
Preference Category 4: Donors who can demonstrate that
notwithstanding their income level, significant financial hardship is
136. See id. at 17,565.
137. Id. at 17,564.
138. Id. at 17,565.
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likely to be encountered for qualifying non-medical expenses in the
course of the donation process.
Preference Category 5: Any live organ donor, notwithstanding income
level or financial hardship, who meets the criteria for donor
reimbursement.139

These proposed guidelines illustrate the prioritized manner in which
reimbursements will be allocated. While preferences for poorer donors
and recipients are sensible, it is unfortunate that the Act cannot provide
economic relief to a larger segment of donors. A tax deduction could act
as a complimentary measure to increase the amount of donors who
receive some measure of relief.
Next, ODRIA is also limited in the amount of relief it can provide
with respect to each individual donor. The language of the statute
provides for the reimbursement of “travel and subsistence expenses
incurred by individuals toward making living donations of their organs”
and “such incidental nonmedical expenses that are so incurred as the
Secretary determines by regulation to be appropriate.”140 The proposed
guidelines define qualifying expenses as “only travel, lodging, and meals
and incidental expenses incurred by the donor and/or accompanying
person(s)” in the course of donor evaluation, the actual donor surgical
procedure, and medical or surgical follow-up procedures.141 These
reimbursement expenses are capped at $6,000.142
Further, lost wages will not be reimbursed under ODRIA. No
explicit reimbursement is found in ODRIA or in the proposed guidelines
for lost wages, which in some cases can be the most expensive burden on
the donor. Thus, a tax deduction which addresses lost wages would
provide an extra measure of assistance beyond ODRIA for working
donors who lose wages, both those who qualify for ODRIA relief, and
those who do not.
Finally, ODRIA is limited in funding and application, both in scope
and in time. The first problem is that it is subject to continuing
appropriations. Currently, it has authorization for $5 million for each
year through fiscal year 2009.143 Given that appropriation could be

139. Id.
140. 42 U.S.C.S. §274f(a) (2007).
141. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 121, at 17,566. The guidelines go on to state that “[t]he
Program will pay for up to five trips per donation or intended donation. Three of these trips may be
for the potential living donor and up to two trips may be for any accompanying person(s).” Id.
142. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C.S. § 274f(f).

459]

ORGAN DONORS AND TAX DEDUCTIONS

481

discontinued after that time, a tax deduction provides another level of
protection against a future Congress that fails to reauthorize spending in
this area.
This Comment argues that even those who can afford the expense of
donation—including those in the middle class and above—should still be
afforded some relief, given the tremendous good that they provide for
society. A tax deduction would serve as a complementary measure to
ensure basic principles of fairness: A tax code that rewards a wealthy
person who donates her old jalopy but not a wealthy person who donates
her kidney still lacks fairness.
C. State Measures
A developing trend in encouraging living organ donors is the stateby-state adoption of legislation to provide to living donors deductions
from their state income taxes. These measures are intended to help living
donors recover their costs and remove disincentives to donation. Such
disincentives arise mainly out of the financial burdens placed on organ
donors, as discussed above.
In 2004, Wisconsin was the first state to provide for a tax deduction
for expenses incurred by living organ donors.144 The enactment, which
received overwhelming support in both houses of the Wisconsin
legislature,145 allows for a deduction of up to $10,000 from adjusted
gross income as applied to state income taxes.146 This deduction may be
claimed for expenses incurred in travel, lodging, and lost wages related
to the organ donation.147 Wisconsin’s law attracted media attention,148
and other states have already followed suit, including Arkansas, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, and Utah.149 Still others are considering similar legislation.150
However, as it stands now, an organ donor in one state may receive tax
relief, but other donors are left in the cold.
144. WIS. STAT. § 71.05(10)(i) (2005). See also Jo Napolitano, Wisconsin Senate Approves
Tax Deduction for Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A12.
145. Napolitano, supra note 133.
146. See id.; Madigan, supra note 102.
147. WIS. STAT. § 71.05(10)(i).
148. See Napolitano, supra note 144.
149. Idaho and Utah have statutes that provide tax credits—$5,000 for Idahoans and $10,000
for Utahans. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3029K (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-1015 (2006). The
other states provide tax deductions of up to $10,000. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-2103 (2005);
GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-27 (2005); IOWA CODE § 422.7(44) (2005); MINN. STAT. § 290.01 Subd.
19b(13) (2006); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-36 (2005).
150. United Network for Organ Sharing, Financial Aspects: Legislation, http://www.
transplantliving.org/livingdonation/financialaspects/legislation.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
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IV. EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A FEDERAL TAX
DEDUCTION
A. The Proposal
This Comment proposes that the federal government follow the
example of the States,151 by amending the tax code to provide a tax
deduction similar to the Wisconsin statute. The tax deduction bill
introduced in 2004 by Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-FL) is a great start,152
although unfortunately, Hastings’ bill never made it out of committee.153
Like Hastings’ measure, this proposal would include medical care not
otherwise covered and lost wages.154 And like Wisconsin’s statute, it
would include travel and lodging expenses.155
A limitation of $20,000 on the deduction would be included
(Hastings’ bill imposed a limitation of $15,000 on the deduction).156 The
bill should allow for the number to be adjusted for inflation. The
deduction would also be limited only to expenses that had not been
otherwise reimbursed or compensated. To the extent the taxpayer
received partial reimbursement through ODRIA or compensation
through any other government program, insurance policy, or payment
from the recipient, he would not be able to claim those expenses. Thus,
while a tax deduction and ODRIA would overlap, they could not be
doubly exploited by the taxpayer. In addition, if the taxpayer resided in a
state with an existing income tax deduction, he would have to elect
between the two—the taxpayer could not receive deductions for both
state and federal income taxes.
The bill would also borrow from the language of ODRIA in
defining who qualifies as a “donating individual.” As in ODRIA, a
“donating individual” would include donors who incur expenses toward
an intended donation in good faith, but for “appropriate” reasons, the
donation never takes place.157 This could be further qualified to include
only prospective donors who were initially deemed healthy enough to
donate.
151. United Network for Organ Sharing, Financial Aspects: State Tax Deductions and Donor
Leave Laws, http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/financialaspects/statetax.aspx (last
visited Feb. 22, 2007).
152. H.R. 4042, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004).
153. 108 Bill Tracking H.R. 4042.
154. Id.
155. WIS. STAT. § 71.05(10)(i)(2005).
156. H.R. 4042, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004).
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274f(c)(1) (West 2005).
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This proposal is not intended to replace the ODRIA, but rather to
complement it by adding another layer of relief. Indeed, a tax deduction
combined with the reimbursements provided by ODRIA is a much better
solution than either on its own. This is because tax deductions are
typically more beneficial to higher-income donors who receive relief
from a higher tax rate. Naturally, most taxpayers would prefer a straight
reimbursement over a deduction, as it amounts to more money in the
donor’s pocket. But since ODRIA gives preference to poorer donors and
excludes reimbursement when recipients have income levels above 200%
of the poverty level, those who are wealthier and do not receive the
reimbursement through ODRIA are still honored and supported by
society through a tax deduction—a deduction that their equally situated
neighbors already receive from donating their used car. Of course, this is
assuming that Congress will not take the preferable course of raising the
amount of money for reimbursement to the point where it will cover all
donors. But as long as less than 100% of donors are reimbursed, a tax
deduction of this sort will be an improvement. Indeed, even if funding is
raised for ODRIA, a tax deduction still provides a valuable safety net in
the event that ODRIA’s funding does not match the amount of living
donors.
B. Objections/Opposing Arguments
Part III discussed various state and federal measures that have
recently been enacted to help living donors. This section discusses the
implications of such measures generally, and specifically will discuss the
state tax deductions and the various arguments for and against
implementing similar legislation at the federal level.
1. Legal concerns
The Wisconsin statute and similar tax deductions pose a “challenge
[to] the extent of the NOTA’s prohibition” on compensating organ
donors.158 This challenge proved politically fatal to Kansas’ proposed
statute; it fell by the wayside after the Kansas attorney general opined
that the statute would conflict with NOTA’s prohibition on valuable
consideration.159
However, the key distinction is that the Wisconsin law and this
Comment’s proposal allow deductions based on the expenses incurred in

158. Arthurs, supra note 7, at 1126.
159. Napolitano, supra note 144.
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donating the organ, not for the expense of the organ itself. The fact that
the deduction is for the expenses and not for the organs is important
because NOTA contains a provision excluding compensation for such
expenses.160 Furthermore, the Senate Report accompanying NOTA
explicitly stated that travel, lodging and wages were not “valuable
consideration” for the purposes of the Act.161 Thus, a properly structured
change in the Tax Code would not stand in conflict with existing law.162
Considering Congress’s adoption of the Federal Organ Donor Leave Act
with its feature of paid leave, a strong argument could be made that
Congress has already chosen to make use of this NOTA exclusion.
2. Normative objections
Critics of tax deductions often object on the grounds that they appear
to be compensating organ donors. This raises ethical objections because
compensation for organ donation runs contrary to what they believe
should continue to be a purely altruistic system.163 Opponents fear a
“slippery slope to the subsequent development of payment for live donor
organs.”164
Supporters of such legislation may respond by pointing out first, that
such a tax deduction would only cover the expenses of donating, and not
the organ itself. No monetary value would be placed upon the actual
organ. Further, the legislation does not so much reward the donor as it
does merely mitigate the economic burdens placed on the donor—the
donor is still losing overall, financially speaking. The sponsor of the
Wisconsin bill, State Representative Steve Wieckert, argued that the bill
did not provide an incentive to donate, but instead provided “simply [for]
the removal of a financial disincentive.”165 Further, he argued, ‘‘[n]o one,
rich or poor, would receive any additional money for donating. All they
would do is lose less money.”166
Given that most living organ donors will only make one such
160. See Arthurs, supra 7, at 1130, for analysis of the application of NOTA’s provisions to the
Wisconsin bill.
161. Id. at 1130 (citing S. REP NO. 98-382 (1984)).
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See Calandrillo, supra note 32, at 111; Julie Deardorff, Living Donors Deserve Payback
for Great Gift, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 2004, at 9.
164. Delmonico, supra note 118.
165. Jeremy Wheelock, Tax Breaks May Relieve Expenses of Organ Donation, THE BADGER
HERALD, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://badgerherald.com/news/2003/09/10/tax_breaks_
may_relie.php.
166. See Napolitano, supra note 144. In addition, scholars have argued that there are ways for
society to “explicitly thank organ donors . . . without jeopardizing its altruistic basis.” Delmonico, et
al., supra note 38, at 25.

459]

ORGAN DONORS AND TAX DEDUCTIONS

485

donation in their lives (with the possible exception of bone marrow
donors), and the other emotional and physical restraints on donating,
there should not be much concern about taxpayers exploiting such
legislation for personal gain.
Further, if the concern is that providing a tax deduction will
improperly provide incentives for those who would not otherwise donate,
lawmakers should also bear in mind that the altruistic standard embraced
in America and embodied in the National Organ Transplant Act is not
immune from attack by outside sources. As one scholar has pointed out,
“the standard of uncompensated donation of organs from living donors is
also being eroded by the opportunity to obtain organs outside the United
States.”167 This opportunity appears to be increasing. As a “global black
market in human organs and a booming transplant tourism industry has
emerged. . . . three hundred Americans travel abroad each year to buy a
human organ.”168 The proposal is only for the expenses incurred in
donating—providing such a reimbursement simply removes monetary
disincentives more than it provides new monetary incentives. The idea,
then, is to make the donor no better off than they were, while attempting
to make them less worse off. Indeed, if steps are not taken to effectively
work within the altruistic system, it seems likely that even more people
will begin to look to outside sources.
With the deduction, the average donor in Wisconsin would see an
actual tax break of $550.169 It is extremely unlikely a tax deduction
would encourage people who would not already be donating in the first
place to undergo the hardships of donation, since the best they can do is
break even financially under ODRIA. At best, a tax deduction would
only lessen expenses, not improve their financial situation. They will
likely continue to donate for other, more humanitarian reasons. This
seems especially likely given that over ninety percent of living donors
donate to family members.170 The goal of a tax deduction, then, would be
to help courageous donors recover a portion of their costs and help to
remove financial barriers to donation.
Other commentators criticize tax deductions because they “seek[] to
incentivize living organ donation without first exploring the effect of

167. Delmonico, et al., supra note 38, at 25.
168. Calandrillo, supra note 32, at 87 (citing Eamonn O’Neill, The Cost of Living, THE
SCOTSMAN, Mar. 10, 2001, at 14, available at 2001 WL 14095051).
169. Jim Ritter, Not Nearly Enough to Go Around; The Future of Organ Transplantation, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, at 19.
170. RICHARD H. HAUBOLDT & NICKOLAS J. ORTNER, 2002 ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANT
COSTS AND DISCUSSION, MILLIMAN RESEARCH REPORT 45 (2002), available at http://www.
transplantliving.org/ContentDocuments/2002_Milliman_Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
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incentivized cadaveric organ donation.”171 They contend that cadaveric
donation is superior to living donation because of the risk to the donor.172
One commentator declared that “although the post-donation mortality
rate is very low for [living donors], even one unnecessary death is an
unreasonable cost to bear. . . . any mortality rate above zero becomes
indefensible when compared to a viable alternative with a mortality rate
of zero.”173 In a newspaper report, a medical ethicist was quoted as
saying, “[b]y encouraging living donors, we’re putting healthy people at
risk. . . . The whole thing is just going in the wrong direction.”174 Some
physicians oppose living organ donation altogether.175
These are powerful arguments, as no one wants to see any donor lose
his or her life trying to save another’s. However, until recovery rates for
cadaver donors are maximized, living donors will be called upon to help
fill the gap.
In response to criticisms, supporters of tax deductions for living
donors may also argue that living donation is a rational and humane
choice given the increased survival rates for recipients of living donor
organs over those of cadaveric organs.176 This is especially true with
kidney transplants. While the gap between one-year survival rates is
narrowing considerably,177 the gap for long-term success rates is still
significant.178 For example, the five-year survival rate is reported as up to
8% higher for recipients of living donors.179
171. Arthurs, supra note 7, at 1126.
172. See id. at 1125–26. Arthurs argues that such deductions should only be viewed as
secondary options, and that we must first pursue “the introduction of financial incentives to promote
cadaveric donation.” Id. at 1129.
173. Id. at 1126.
174. Chris Fusco, Wisconsin Eases Financial Burden on Organ Donors, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan.
23, 2004, at 18.
175. Id. See also Owen S. Surman et al., Some Ethical and Psychiatric Aspects of Right-Lobe
Liver Transplantation in the United States and Japan, 43 PSYCHOSOMATICS 347, 348, 352 (Sept.Oct. 2002).
176. See Medical College of Wisconsin, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
177. New York Organ Donor Network, Survival Rates, http://www.nyodn.org/organ/o_
donationfacts_survival.html (last visited March 12, 2007); Medical College of Wisconsin, supra note
78.
178. This gap grows wider as time passes subsequent to surgery. International Association of
Living Donors, Inc., Living Donors Online, http://www.livingdonorsonline.org/HLAData.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2007).
179. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, All Kaplan-Meier Survival Rates for
Transplants Performed: 1997–2004, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp (last visited Mar.
13, 2007). See also Mayo Clinic, Kidney Transplant: Regain Your Independence with a Donor
Kidney, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/kidney-transplant/DA00094 (last visited Mar. 12, 2007);
Press Release, Neoral, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Press Release: Large Scale Registry
Analysis Shows Long-Term Graft Survival is Significantly Improved in Living Donor Kidney
Transplant Patients Receiving Neoral© (Cyclosporine USP) Modified (June 3, 2003),
http://www.pharma.us.novartis.com/newsroom/pressReleases/releaseDetail.jsp?PRID=803.
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Therefore, in certain cases, relying solely on cadaveric donors may
preserve lives of those who would have been living donors, but may
place at slightly greater risk the lives of the recipients. Obviously, in our
world of organ shortages, many parents who are healthy and can donate
would rather make such a donation than take the risk of their child facing
discouraging odds on the waiting list. However, even with an available
cadaveric donor organ, family members may still reasonably choose to
use a living donor organ to increase the survival rate for the recipients.
For example, two parents featured in a Washington Post article, Scott
and Carolyn Johnson, made the choice to increase their child’s chances
for survival and a longer, healthier life by choosing to donate their own
kidneys.180 According to a Kidney Foundation official commenting on
the Johnson family’s decision, “[i]f you look at the statistics, the survival
rate of a deceased-donor kidney is between 10 to 12 years, whereas a
living-donor kidney can last for 25 to 30 years.”181 While the survival
rate for cadaveric organ recipients is improving,182 this disparity is still
compelling.
Even disregarding such parental choices, while critics like Arthurs
may be correct that cadaveric donation is preferable over living donation,
we must not ignore the reality: until the shortage is resolved, living
donors will continue to be called upon. While such a reality persists, we
should endeavor to improve living donors’ quality of life and remove
disincentives for donation. These efforts should, of course, coincide with
larger efforts to increase organ procurement. Even if such tax deductions
are to be considered as only “secondary options,”183 the failure to
successfully make progress in the realm of cadaveric organ procurement
should not constrain us from addressing secondary options, nor should it
prevent us from improving the quality of life of courageous organ
donors.
3. Economic concerns and the automobile donor versus the organ donor
Because tax deductions decrease revenue, objections may arise on
fiscal grounds, especially at the state government level where budgets are
smaller. For instance, the Wisconsin bill is projected to cost Wisconsin
about $115,000 in tax revenues annually.184
180. Ellen Crosby, Back From the Brink of a Medical Nightmare; Kidneys Donated, Parents
Save Son, Daughter, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at T01.
181. Id.
182. Medical College of Wisconsin, supra note 78.
183. Arthurs, supra note 7, at 1129.
184. Dep’t of Legislative Serv., Md. Gen. Assembly, 2005 Session, Fiscal and Policy Note to
SB 443, Income Tax - Subtraction Modification for Living Organ Donors (estimating that
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On a broader level, the first response to this objection is purely
humanitarian. How much in lost revenue is one life worth? Many would
agree that a $550 loss on a state level is a small price to pay for another
life. Given the amount the federal government spends to save lives in
other spheres of its influence, $550 seems like a bargain.
More to the point though, cost savings in other areas can recover
many of the lost revenues. In short, living organ donors are an economic
benefit to society. As donors give organs, patients recover more quickly.
They can thus more quickly begin work and paying taxes back to the
government. More importantly, they do not incur to themselves nor
externalize to society the additional costs of medicine and being kept
alive as they await a transplant. By increasing organ supply, the waiting
list gets smaller for all recipients. Policymakers should remember that
patients who are on the waiting list for a transplant are steadily accruing
large medical bills and placing additional strain on our health care
system, thus driving health care costs up.
Cost savings are also noteworthy in the argument for federal funding,
as substantial amounts of such patients are on Medicare.185 One doctor,
testifying before Congress made this statement concerning covering the
costs of the Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act:
This program could also offer substantial cost savings for the Medicare
program.
Essentially, for every new transplanted kidney from a living donor,
Medicare would avoid direct dialysis costs of approximately $55,000
per year for each patient transplanted since the waiting time for a
deceased donor kidney is approximately 4 years longer than a living
donor kidney. Therefore, for every new donor facilitated by this
program, Medicare would save approximately $220,000 over four
years, minus the cost of immunosuppressive drugs.186

Maryland’s similar measure would decrease general fund revenues by $64,000 annually). See also
Organ Donation; Wisconsin Organ Donors May See Tax Deductions, HEALTH & MEDICINE WEEK,
Feb 16, 2004, at 639. Missouri, meanwhile, estimated that loss of revenue would not exceed $36,900
annually. Mo. Comm. on Legislative Research Oversight Div., Fiscal Note, L.R. No. 3725-01,
available at http://www.moga.state.mo.us/oversight/OVER06/fispdf/3725-01N.ORG.PDF (last
visited January 25, 2007).
185. See Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donations Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations, 108th Cong. 61 (2003) (written statement of Richard M. Devos, a heart
transplant recipient) (“Each kidney transplanted alone saves between $200,000 and $400,000 to the
insurers paying to keep these patients alive on the waiting list. Medicare pays 60% of these bills.”)
[hereinafter Devos].
186. Bumgardner, supra note 13, at 3. See also Devos, supra note 185, at 61 (“Each kidney
transplanted alone saves between $200,000 and $400,000 to the insurers paying to keep these
patients alive on the waiting list. Medicare pays 60% of these bills.”).
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These costs do not include the economic ripple effect waiting for a
transplant can have. Such calculations cannot take into account the lost
economic production of the patient on the waiting list. Further,
lawmakers would do well to consider the economic consequences
endured by the patient’s family, especially when that patient is the
primary “breadwinner.” Patients that are a primary income source for
their household have a greater economic effect, and being left untreated
leaves dependents to drain resources from private charities or
government programs. In the absence of a breadwinner, reliance on
government services naturally will increase.
Further, criticism focused on lost revenue also seems misplaced
when considering these tax deductions alongside others that are obtained
by donating used automobiles to charitable institutions, which raise large
amounts of money for organizations such as the National Kidney
Foundation.187 By way of illustration, consider a hypothetical situation of
a man who desperately seeks a kidney transplant. Imagine this man has
two sisters, both equally committed to helping their sibling. Both
undergo screening in order to determine if they are a possible kidney
donor for their brother. One sister qualifies to be a donor, and the other
does not. The qualifying donor then goes through a battery of tests, as
described above, and the physical trauma of making the donation. She
incurs great expenses in the process—expenses which her brother’s
insurance will not, nor can he afford to pay out of his own pocket. She
looks for relief under ODRIA, but is rejected.
The other sister, determined to contribute in some way, looks for
ways to help. She visits the website of the National Kidney Foundation.
There she learns that its “Kidney Cars” program facilitates the donation
of cars by citizens to the Foundation, with the Foundation using the
proceeds to fund “public health education, organ donation programs and
medical research to prevent kidney disease.”188 She learns that people
like her who donate their car to the National Kidney Foundation—or a
myriad of others that qualify as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization—
are eligible to receive a deduction from their federal taxable income.189
While it seems doubtful that anyone would argue the tax code is
typically fair, the inequities here are stark. Two sisters, both equally
committed to their sick brother, both equally altruistic. One puts her life
in danger, undergoes the expenses of travel and of missing valuable work
187. See Stacey Singer, Tax, Not Charity, Drives People to Donate Cars, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Apr. 19, 1998, at A26; Top Ten Reasons to Donate Your Used Car to the National Kidney
Foundation of Georgia, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 14, 2003, at 1.
188. National Kidney Foundation, supra note 18.
189. 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)3 (2006); 26 U.S.C.S § 170 (2006).
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time (and in rare cases may even risk losing her job), undergoes
economic hardship, physical and psychological trauma; the other,
donates her old Ford Taurus and takes a tax deduction. The inequities
seem more intuitively unfair when the situation involves a typical
automobile donor—who is probably more motivated by the tax break
than altruism.
Is it fair that individuals who risk the most by undergoing surgery be
placed at a relative disadvantage to those who simply drop their jalopy
off at the local charity? Tax deductions for living donors may be justified
because they introduce greater fairness into the system by placing those
who sacrifice the most on similar footing to those who receive similar tax
benefits by simply donating their used car or cash.190
Indeed, the inequities do not end there. Even if the donor lives in a
state that allows for deductions from state income tax, those who donate
an organ are still at a disadvantage compared to those who donate their
used automobile, since those donating the car benefit from the deduction
within the federal code, which taxes at a much higher rate than do
states.191 Further, some states do not even have a state income tax
system,192 and those that do, tax income at different rates.193 Introducing
a tax deduction at the federal level would be the great equalizer among
all American living donors.
In addition, such a tax deduction on a federal level would make more
sense for states as it more fairly accords with “matching principles.” In
other words, a donor may currently receive the benefit of a tax deduction
in Wisconsin despite the fact that the donor who is benefited with the
organ lives in another state. By allowing for federal deductions, this
would eliminate such inequities to a large degree. The federalist
counterargument would likely be that each state should be free to
experiment with its own system. However, it should be countered that
there would be nothing to prevent states from having unique systems of
their own. Indeed, a prudent federal tax provision would require a
taxpayer in a state with its own deduction to choose between the two.
190. See Phil Brinkman, Organ Donor Deduction Advances; Budget Committee Backs Effort
to Spur Donations by Living Donors, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003, at B1.
191. The lowest marginal tax rate at the federal level is 15%. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1(c) (West 2005).
The highest state income tax marginal rate in 2006 was 9.3%, in California. TAX POLICY CENTER,
STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES 2000–2006 (2007) http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
TaxFacts/TFDB/Content/PDF/state_income_rates.pdf.
192. Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do not have
state income taxes. New Hampshire and Tennessee levy an income tax on dividend and interest
income only.
193. Even though other states have modeled Wisconsin and gone with a $10,000 deduction,
tax rates vary. Further, some states, like Washington, do not have state income taxes. Calandrillo,
supra note 32, at 112.
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More to the point, charitable contributions are already squarely in the
realm of the Federal Tax Code. Failing to recognize the contribution of
an organ as being as a “charitable contribution” seems absurd. What
more can a person give than of her own body?
Again, it is not an in-kind donation of the organ that is being
deducted, but rather it is the expense of donating it, which can be more
closely analogized to a charitable cash deduction.
4. Other objections
If a tax deduction for living donors is seen primarily as a move to
provide incentives to donate, and not as a move to compensate, other
arguments may arise. Since statistics indicate that women are more likely
to donate organs but less likely to be recipients than men are, feminist
arguments may be implicated.194 Many reasons have been suggested to
explain the greater-than-expected disproportion regarding gender in
donation, both medical195 and practical.196 Some scholars suggest greater
ambivalence about donation for males, while others suggest that “men
may be less available or less able to donate.”197 However, policymakers
concerned with this disproportion may actually favor systems of
reimbursement for living donors, as scholars have suggested that “the
absence of a guaranteed system of reimbursement for lost wages for
donors may impact both the recipient’s and the donor’s interest in having
a primary breadwinner (statistically more often male in the USA)
undergo [the donation].”198
Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, naysayers may argue that
providing economic relief to living donors undermines their sacrifice and
cheapens the most courageous of gifts. This argument is not easily
dismissed. We are reminded that it is the altruistic, selfless sacrifices of
family members, friends, and fellow citizens that point to who the real
heroes are in society. The argument follows that we should strive to
avoid tainting these heroic sacrifices with any hint of monetary
inducement.

194. In 1999, 57.3% of U.S. organ donors were female. See also MACHADO, supra note 24, at
56–57; Nikola Biller-Andorno, Gender Imbalance in Living Organ Donation, MED., HEALTH CARE,
AND PHIL. 5, 199 (2002). See also Liise K. Kayler et al., Gender Imbalance and Outcomes in Living
Donor Renal Transplantation in the United States, AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION, 452 (Apr. 2003).
195. One explanation is that females may be less biologically able to accept kidney
transplants, while their typically smaller kidneys are more amenable of donation. Kayler, supra note
194, at 455–57.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 455.
198. Id. at 456.

492

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

However, a response to these naysayers is that we must, as a society,
choose to recognize and honor such heroes. While such donors probably
would say they are more honored by the lives of those they save, our
government can further honor their sacrifices by simply elevating it to
the same level as cash contributors.
A federal tax deduction for expenses would not trivialize the gift
because it does not place any cash value on a kidney or a liver to he who
has given an organ up for the benefit of another. Indeed, the out-ofpocket monetary expenses may in fact be the smallest part of the donor’s
sacrifice and/or the least significant. But in assisting with those expenses,
we are symbolically proclaiming—yes, even through the tax code—that
in our nation we do not value a gift of life less than a gift of cash. Thus,
in providing cash relief, we paradoxically demonstrate that cash is not
the only important thing in our society, and that it is the smallest
recognition and repayment we can offer to organ donors.
V. CONCLUSION
A tragic shortage of donor organs persists199 despite its devastating
physical and economic consequences, and despite overwhelming public
support in favor of both types of donation.200 Living donors have stepped
in to save the lives of family members, friends, and complete strangers.
In doing so, these donors not only give the gift of life and lighten the
financial burdens of organ recipients, but they also make a positive
economic impact on society as they free up resources and reduce medical
expenses. Society, in turn, should recognize these sacrifices by pursuing
policy that lightens the financial burdens borne by donors. Society
already recognizes charitable sacrifices; the Federal Tax Code provides
tax deductions for those who contribute cash or a used car to a charitable
organization such as the National Kidney Foundation, yet turns a blind
eye to a deeper and more serious kind of sacrifice—the courageous
sacrifice of the living donor.
In 2004, Congress took a step in the right direction with the Organ
Donation and Recovery Improvement Act. However, this step was not
complete and leaves the door open for some organ donors to bear alone
the financial burden of giving the gift of life. Given that such sacrifices
contribute to the common welfare and economic good of society, they
should never be left unnoticed.
Living donor tax deductions should be adopted on a federal level to

199. See supra notes 3–11 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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compliment the ODRIA and to bring a greater measure of fairness into a
tax code that rewards those who donate cash or used cars to charity, but
ignores those who actually go under the knife. Further, deductions may
help mitigate or remove obstacles standing in the way of those who wish
to give the “gift of life.” The limited economic compensation does not
violate altruistic principles, because it merely reduces or eliminates
donors’ losses and does not provide them with gains. Rather, by
collectively supporting donors through U.S. government reimbursements
and federal tax deductions, the altruism of the system is merely spread
over the taxpayer base.
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